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Module 10

Vietnam Era (late 1940s to 1975)

  1. The first steps toward war
    1. United States had been involved in Indochina since the late 1940s by giving aid of money and arms to the France. US was obligated through NATO, especially after Communist invasion of North Vietnam. No direct ground troops are sent. First Indochina War lasted from 1945-1954, when the French regained control from communist insurgents.
    2. At the Geneva Conference (1954), Indochina was divided into N Vietnam (pro-communist), S Vietnam (anti-communist), Laos (neutral), and Cambodia (neutral)
    3. Unrest pervades region, and communist takeover is a threat to S Vietnam by the early 1960s.
    4. 1960/1961 the US had approx. 1,000 advisors in Vietnam, by 1963 JFK increased that number to over 16,000 “advisors” with many involved in military training and covert operations with the South Vietnamese
  2. LBJ and Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964-65)
    1. Congress authorizes US troops to be sent. Bombing campaign begins and US takes over ground war in 1965, bear the brunt of fighting for 1st 7 mos. of 1965
      1. rationale: S Vietnam about to go down the drain, Vietcong (VC) are South Vietnamese turned communist guerilla force and indigenous so must root out, and LBJ announces that US troops are there to protect air bases only
      2. US now committed to war
  3. The Vietnam War, 1965-1975
    1. Air bombing campaign against strategic targets in N Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and VC positions in S Vietnam (1965-67)
      1. N Vietnam mostly rural, few important targets–move to periphery
      2. Propaganda public outrage over civilian deaths so US airmen held as POWs and hostages by the VC
      3. Heavy, dense jungle around Ho Chi Minh Trail absorb most of bomb fire so move toward ARCLIGHT Strikes: air strikes vs enemy troops from high altitudes, devastating physical and psychological gridded bomb concentration dropped by B-52s–tremendous accuracy and destruction in a squared area
      4. Bombing of S Vietnam restricted to specific VC targets to protect the allies there as well as civilians—the problem was that friends versus enemies were hard to determine
    2. Ground War (1965-67)
      1. N Vietnam access to manpower virtually unlimited through China and large country, also retained strategic initiative throughout war (US could not advance into N Vietnam)
      2. US Strategic Problems:
        1. jungle terrain and equatorial climate
        2. geography was vulnerable to attack through Laos and Cambodia
        3. blunders of LBJ and Robert McNamara–very incompetent, misinterpreted the nature of guerilla war and the threat presented by the insurgents
          1. LBJ: political failures
            • no international experience,
            • poor advisors,
            • influenced by logistics and logic based on scientific principles,
            • contempt for military establishment,
            • micro-management,
            • overall bombing theory flawed as it caused escalation and gradualism–allowed enemy to adjust
            • refusal to invade N Vietnam because feared Chinese reprisals—this essentially led to capturing territory only to retreat once it was secured, added to the futility of the war
            • utter disaster in civilian leadership
          2. Robert McNamara (Secy of Defense): military failures
            • Accepted president’s dictates, refused to defy president’s orders (feared Douglas MacArthur’s fate as he had lost his command when he defied President Eisenhower during the Korean War)
            • Careerism in military, managerial approach
            • Emphasis on body count: statistical compilations to determine policy, number of dead soldiers weighed versus gains or losses, belief that large body count did not mean losing (kind of reverse attrition)
    3. Major Offensives (1965-68)
      1. Ia Drang Valley (1965): major offensive with great success vs N Vietnam but heavy US casualties, allowed VC to adjust to US artillery and helicopters
      2. General William Westmoreland, instituted “Search and Destroy” strategy
        1. Mekong Delta: new front of infantry division using riverine operations
        2. Goals: clean out VC infrastructure, free main road to Saigon, and take “Rice Bowl” from communist domination
      3. Khe Sanh: outpost besieged by VC troops as a diversionary tactic prior to the Tet Offensive, climactic battle but not the focal point for the N Vietnam offensive vs US
      4. Tet Offensive (Jan 1968): diverse attacks by VC to draw troops away from Saigon then attack ARVN and US troops there; major demoralization of US troops even though they achieved great victory
        1. turning point for pulling out of Vietnam, casualties estimated at 40,000 KIA VC versus 3,000-4,000 KIA US but big tactical win
        2. defeat on strategic level because (1) media report as mass US failure and lose further home support (2) LBJ drops sustaining effort (futility)–best opportunity for US to push into N Vietnam to finally move on the offensive but other forces prevent it
    4. Richard Nixon and Retreat (1969-1973)
      1. Vietnamization (1969-70): distribution of American financial aid to fund and arm a new People’s Self-Defense Force
        1. rural security aided the “Accelerated Pacification Campaign” which substituted money for economic investment and land reform for American lives (POWs)
        2. turned main role in the war over to S Vietnam while pulling US forces out
      2. Domestic led Cambodia Bombings (1970): very successful but mass protest at home such as Kent State; Lam Son (1971) US air support saves total defeat but shows that Vietnamization was a failure; Easter Offensive (1972) VC invade DMZ (demilitarized zone) with tanks, over 60,000US troops there, 6,000 in combat–Nixon increases bombing of Hanoi (N Vietnam capital)
      3. 1972 Peace Talks: Nixon gets in ’72 what he could have had in ’68, wasted 4 years of US lives, N Vietnam and S Vietnam reach agreement but fails
      4. War continues: (1972-1975) N Vietnam invades S Vietnam though US tries to buy them off with offers of rebuilding and money; By 1974, communist N Vietnam winning and S Vietnamese capital of Saigon falls May 1, 1975
  4. Aftermath of Vietnam, by 1975
    1. Major demoralization of US troops and politics, interestingly most of the people who were discontented were NOT draftees but people who did not go and serve (hypocrisy on all sides)
    2. Rampant drug use, racial problems, “fraggins”–malcontents with military cause, anti-war protestors
    3. Military and servicemen all but abandoned by Congress who viewed them as dirty and stupid, failed image of military glory/success of previous generations plus anything to do with the military was considered political suicide in terms of the general constituency (and possible re-election)
    4. Troops were NOT defeated on the battlefield or military action but by poor leadership, management of the war caused the failures rather than those executing the orders
    5. In reaction to the age, after 1975, Nixon changed the US military to an all volunteer force, abolished draft as positive development and reduce tension with war protestors
    6. Vietnam was a shameful period in American history, not only in terms of American democratic arrogance (assuming that victory over communist N Vietnam was all but a certainty) but its unrealistic expectations and poor treatment of American servicemen when those goals were not accomplished
    7. This decade of upheaval affected an entire generation, those actively involved at the time and those born during the period, in fundamental ways—whether they were positive or negative is open to debate.

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